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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALYIN H. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
COBX\Vj.\LL WAREHOUSE COM-
P.\~Y, and ERNEST JAMES, 
Defendants, Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Oase No. 
9921 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an Appeal from a Judgment by the Honor-
able Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial 
Distric-t Court from an Order and Judgment of Non-suit 
and Judgment for Defendant Non Obstante Verdicto in 
favor of the defendants and against the Plaintiff. Plain-
tiff is seeking reinstatement of a Special Verdict in his 
favor and against the Defendants. The case arises out 
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of a collision between two automobiles at an intersection 
which resulted in personal injury to the plaintiff, and 
damage to his automobile, causl.ng loss of e'arnings and 
medical expenses. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case now on appeal was presented to the Jury 
by the Trial Court on a Special Verdict. Special Verdict 
consisted of two propositions : 
Proposition No. 1 read as follows: 
PROPOSITION NO. 1 
The Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in 
the operation of his automobile in the following 
particulars: 
(a) In not keeping a proper lookout .................... . 
No preponderance of the evidence 
either way. 
(b) In failing to yield the right-of-w.ay 
X 
to the defendant False 
No preponderance of the evidence 
either way ................... . 
(c) In failing to have· his automobile 
under control False 
.................................. 
No preponderance of the evidence 
either way ................... . 
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(If you have answered "True" o:n a Subdi~s~on 
of Proposition No. 1, do not consider Proposition 
No.2) 
PROPOSITION NO. 2 concerned damages only, 
and the Jury Verdict amounted to $3,131.09. 
The Court entered Judgment upon the Verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant for the 
$3,131.09; thereafter, on Motion for New Trial filed 
by the defendants, the Court made its Order and J udg-
ment of Non-suit, and Judgment for defendant, N. 0. V., 
the Court finding as a matter of law, that the plaintiff 
was contributarily negligent, failing to keep a proper 
lookout, and in failing to yield the right of way to the 
defendant's vehicle which entered the intersection first, 
and at a time when plaintiff's vehicle was not in the 
intersection, or so close as to constitute .an immediate 
hazard. From this Order the Appeal was prosecuted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, by this Appeal, seeks to have this Court 
reinstate the Judgment on Verdict entered on the Special 
Verdict as found by the Trial Court Jury, on the ground 
that the Court's Order violates the rights of the plaintiff 
as guaranteed by Amendment No. VII of the Constitu-
tion of the United States in that said Amendment pro-
vides as follows : 
"In suits at Common Law, where the value 
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in Controversy shall exceed $20.00, the right of 
Trial by Jury, shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined 
in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the Common Law." 
And Article "I" Section 10 of the Constitution of Ftah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 31st, 1962, at approximately 4:45 P. M., at 
the intersection of 2nd South and 3rd West Streets in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, a truck driven by Defendant, 
J am·es, on the business of Cornwall vV arehouse Company, 
collided with a 1957 Chevrolet Station Wagon, being 
driven by plaintiff, the owner thereof. 
Plaintiff filed his action. Defendant answered, and 
the Pretrial Order set the issue to be tried as those set 
forth in the Complaint and Answer. The Complaint 
charged defendants with negligence as follows: 
a) Failure to keep a proper looxout; 
b) Failure to keep said automobile under pro-
per control ; 
c) Failure to yield the right of way; 
d) Failure to stop at the stop sign on Third t 
West Street at the intersection; 
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r) Entering said intersection when it was not 
s·afe to do so; ·and 
f) ~ntering said intersection at a speed which 
was not reasonable under the circumstances. 
The Answer denied negligence on the part of the 
dei'Pndants, and alleged as an affirmative defense that 
the accident was caused solely, or pro:ximately contri-
buted to by the negligenee of the plaintiff. 
At the intersection where the collision occurred, the 
eastbound traffic on Second South has the right of way 
over the southbound traffic on 3rd West, and northbound 
traffic on Third West. Traffic moving west on 2nd 
South is also required to stop by a stop sign at the 
intersection. 
The only traffic having the right to proceed through 
the intersection without stopping being traffic eastbound 
on 2nd South. 
Plaintiff was eastbound on 2nd South, Defendants 
W(:\re southbound on 3rd West, and making a left turn 
through the intersection to go east on 2nd South. 
As Plaintiff approached the intersection, he ob-
served the truck of defendant stopped at the stop sign 
facing south on 3rd West Street. (Record 139). He pro-
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ceeded through the intersection at a speed of from 20 to 
25 miles per hour, and was struck on the left rear side 
of his car as he approached the east side of the intersec-
tion. He saw the defendant's truck a moment before the 
impact occurred. 
Plaintiff testified that he looked for traffic and was 
alert to the hazards in the intersection, (R. 141, 142), 
and saw the defendant's truck coming at him from the 
left side moments before the impact occurred. (R. 142). 
Plaintiff's estimate of defendant's speed was between 
10 to 15 miles per hour. Defendant's estimate of his own 
speed was 8, 9, or 10 miles per hour (R. 256). 
The trial Court, on the basis of the evidence outlined, 
found as a matter of law "The plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout and 
in failing to yield the right of way to defendant's vehicle 
which entered the intersection first and at a time when 
plaintiff's vehicle was not in the intersection, or so close 
as to constitute a hazard, and that plaintiff's claim is 
barred by plaintiff's contributory negligence. (R. 88) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT. 
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The Trial Court, by its 111ling setting aside the ver-
di..t in favor of th€ plaintiff and against defendants is 
ruling in effect that even though plaintiff is on a street 
protected by a Stop Sign, he must continuously watch 
the automobile which has stopped for the intersection, 
and avoid in every event any movement by such auto-
mobile. 
The Intersection Laws of the State of Utah have 
been the subject of legislative enactment since the last 
rase discussing this matter of which the plaintiff Is 
aware. The intersection law now reads as follows: 
"Section 41-6-73: Vehicle turning left at In-
tersection. - The driver of a vehicle within an 
intersection intending to turn to the left shall 
yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching 
from th€ opposite direction which is within the 
intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an 
immediate hazard, during the time when such 
driver is moving within the intersection." 
This Section now makes it the duty of a driver ap-
proaching from a stop sign to yield the right of way to 
all vehicles that are so close as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard, "during the time when such driver is mov-
ing within the intersection." There can be no question 
now, under this Section which was enacted by the Legis-
lature in 1961, that a person on a disfavored highway 
must wait until traffic which might be a hazard to him 
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while he is moving in the intersection has cleared through 
the intersection. 
The Section of the Law which was applicable to in-
tersection right of way, prior to 1961, was Section 41-6-
7 4, U. C. A. 1953 which provided that a person after 
stopping for a stop sign could proceed if no vehicle was 
approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate 
hazard. 
Plaintiff submits that under the facts and circum-
stances of this case, there could not be presented a purely 
legal question as to plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
The question is one of the most difficult, complicated, 
and sensitive questions of fact, and as a oonsequence, 
must be left to the Jury for determination if plaintiff 
is to be granted his constitutional rights to a trial by 
Jury. 
The general law seems to be clear. It is stated in 
Volume 5A American Jurisprudence, page 686, Section 
712: 
"A driver who makes reasonable observation 
before entering an intersection is not contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law for failing to 
make additional observation. "\Vhen it appears to 
be safe to cross an inters·ection, an automobile 
Driver's contributory negligence in the light of 
the defendant's unanticipated speed or other 
negligence is for the Jury. 
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"Clearly, however, the fact that the plaintiff 
proceeded into or across an intersection with the 
ti·affie signal or sign in his favor ordinarily pre-
cludes finding him guilty of such negligence as a 
matter of law, and he is sometimes held free of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law in such 
circumstances.'' 
See also : Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automo h]e 
Law and Practice, Volume 10, Part 2, Section 
6619 P. 10-17, and 1956 Cumulative Pocket Part, 
No. 6619, P. 7-20. 
This Court adopted the rule set forth as a general 
law in the United States in the case of Will~ams vs. 
Zion's Cooperative Mercamtile Institution, 6 Utah 2d. 
283, 312 Pac. 2d. 564. 
This Court, in the Williams case stated the Law 
which we believe is beyond possibility of distinction on 
facts very simil·ar to those now before this Court. In 
that case, the Court stated; 
"A fact question was presented as to whether 
defendant entered the intersection when plaintiff 
was therein, or if defendant entered the intersec-
tion when plaintiff was approaching so closely on 
said through highway as to constitute an immedi-
ate hazard. The further fact question was pre-
sented as to whether defendant had entered the 
intersection under such circumstances as to im-
pose on plaintiff the duty of yielding the right of 
way. Those are proper jury questions and should 
have been submitted. 
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"After plaintiff observed defendant stopped 
at the stop sign, plaintiff traveled the 25 feet and 
the north half of the intersection with Third Ave-
nue before the impact occurred. At 20 miles an 
hour, plaintiff would travel that distance in less 
than a second and a half. Had plaintiff without 
the loss of any tim·e whatsover realized, when she 
saw defendant stopped, that defendant was going 
to pull into the intersection, regardless of plain-
tiff's position, still with most favorable road con-
ditions and a vehicle mechanically perfect, 
plaintiff would have traveled 43 feet and into the 
course of defendant's truck before her car could 
have been stopped. We cannot say that plaintiff 
was negligent as a matter of law in driving into 
the intersection under the conditions present. 
Plaintiff's negligence, if she was negligent, in so 
doing is not so apparent that all reasonable minds 
would .agree upon that fact. 
"Nor are we able to say with certainty that 
her negligence, if any, in so doing was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. That, too, was a fact 
question to be determined by the Jury - being 
one on which reasonable minds might well and 
probably would disagree." 
In addition to the Williams case, this Court on seve-
ral occasions has held that in intersection collisions a 
more difficult and closer question, as far as contributory 
negligence is concerned, can hardly be conceived. In the 
following cases, this Court has steadfastly held that in 
intersection collisions where time, distance, and other 
such important factors are a matter of opinion, and 
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usually driver opinion, the question of negligence, con-
hibutory negligence, are matters which should be left 
for the Jury to determine. See the following cases: 
Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127, 262 Pac. 2d 760, Martin 
v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 Pac. 2d. 747, Poulsen v. 
Mantness, 121 Utah 269, 241 Pac. 2d. 152, Lowder v. 
Hallen, 120 Utah 231, 233 Pac. 2d 350; Martin v. Shef-
field, 112 Utah -!78, 189 Pac. 2d. 127. B,ates v. Burns, 3 
(Ttah 2d. 180, 281 Pac. 2d. 209, and Larsen v. Evans, 12 
{Ttah 2d. 45, 364 Pac. 2d, 1088, are additional Utah cases 
which demonstrate the adherence of this Court to the 
basic and fundamental rules that questions of negli-
grnce, contributory negligence and proximate cause, in 
intersection collisions are questions of fact, ·and cases 
which require the Jury not only to find facts, but to 
apply standards of care, and the Jury, the·refore, must 
be left to apply the standards and determine the basic 
facts. 
There are several cases from jurisdiction other than 
Utah similar to the situation before the Court. One of 
the most interesting cases is Pollind v. Polic"'fb, 78 Cal. 
App. 2d 87, 177 P. 2d. 63. In this case the person on the 
disfavored roadway observed the favored driv-er a~ 
proaching approximately two hundred feet away. The 
question was whether or not the favored driver was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to ob-
serve the disfavored driver leave the stop sign and pro-
ceed into the intersection. The California Statute is 
~imilar to the Utah law quoted. The Court stated: 
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"Defendant had a right to assume not only 
that the car in which plaintiff was riding would 
make the required stop at 43rd Street, until he 
observed or, in the exercise of ordinary care, 
would have observed that the Driver was not mak-
ing a stop, but also that the Ford car would not 
enter the intersection in front of cars approach-
ing so closely as to constitute hazard. Defendant 
testified that he saw the Ford car approaching 
when it was about 30 feet west of the intersection, 
but as he was passing the Pulliam car his view of 
the Ford was obstructed as he approached the 
intersection, and that he assumed that Secrest, 
the Ford driver would stop long enough to allow 
his car and the Pulliam car to pass through the 
intersection first. He also testified that he next 
saw the Ford when it was about 12 or 15 feet in 
front of him, but that he, the defendant, could 
not swerve to the right to avoid a collision be-
cause of the Pulliam car. Secrest testified that 
he saw the Pulliam car approaching but did not 
see that of defendant. It was clearly a question 
of fact whether defendant was guilty of negli-
gence in assuming that Secrest would not enter 
the intersection in front of his car and that of 
Pulliam, but would remain at the boulevard stop 
sign until the two cars had passed." (Page 65). 
An additional authority directly in point concerning 
the duty of the person on a through highway is De Priest 
v. City of Glendale, 74 Cal. App. 2d 464, 169 P. 2d. 17. 
Here, the plaintiff admittedly failed to maintain a con-
stant lookout as he approached the intersection and did 
not observe the car which came into collision with him. 
The California Court following the general rule again 
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held that tmder the fads and circumstances the negli-
gt>net- and contributory negligence were questions of fact 
for the Jury to determine. 
One of the most important cases which seems to be 
dirt-('tly in point is Mead v. Cochran, 184 F. 2d. 579. This 
ea~e involved an accident on the open highway. The de-
fendant left a stop sign after stopping and turned in 
front of the plaintiff's automobile. There was a collision. 
The basic question was whether or not plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent since his testimony indicated that 
he did not see the defendant's car at any time prior to 
the impact. The Fede·ral Circuit Court following the 
gmwral rule, held this was a question ·of fact to he sub-
mitted to the jury to apply the basic standards of care 
on the part of the driver of the automobile on the through 
highway. The following quote sets forth the facts and 
ruling: 
"Furthermore, plaintiff did testify that he 
looked to his left about 100 feet from the inter-
section and that before reaching that point there 
were trees and bushes on his left along old Route 
40 which obstructed his view. Under the circum-
stances it might be that defendant's stationary car 
did not make a permanent mental impression 
upon the plaintiff. Defendant's automobile had 
been at a stand-still at some point within 15 to 
23 feet distant from the pavement of new Route 
40. Defendant suddenly started his automobile in 
motion, intending to cross the center line of new 
Route 40 and then swing to his left in order to 
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proceed along it in a northeasterly direction." 
"Under the facts of this case we believe that 
the question of contributory negligenc·e was a 
question of fact for the jury." (Page 581). 
In Foresman v. Pepin, 71 F. Supp. 772, affirmed 
161 F. 2d. 872. Plaintiff approached on a through high-
way and observed that on her left the traffic on the 
highway was stopped, she then proceeded to cross 
through the intersection and did not look to the right to 
see the truck of defendant which was approaching and 
which ultimately came into collision with her. It was con-
ceded that if plaintiff had looked to the right at the 
intersection, she may have been able to avo[d the colli-
sion with the truc;k owned by the defendant. The Federal 
District Court submitted the case to the Jury. He over-
ruled the motions for a new trial and was affirmed on 
appeal. Held that the contributory negligence of plain-
tiff was a question of fact for the jury. 
The discussion in the Foresman case concerns the 
normal habits of drivers who are on through highways 
and who cross intersections where other traffic is wait-
ing. Once a driver commits himself to a certain course of 
conduct, i. ·e., crossing the intersection, additional ob-
servation may or may not he possible. The significance 
of the driver's actions in eithe-r causation or in applying 
the standards of care is for the jury to determine. It 
would be a very unusual situation if the driver could 
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prevent collision should another vehicle enter the inter-
section after he had commenced the crossing. 
CONOLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the lookout which 
a person approaching an intersection on a through high-
way must ma:ke is dependent upon the surrounding cir-
cumstances. Whether the lookout is one which is reason-
ablP, which a prudent person would make, must be left 
to the Jury for its determination. Whether the making 
of additional observations would have prevented a colli-
sion is also a fact question. The trial Court erroneously 
granted the verdict Non Obstante Verdicto. This Court 
~hould reverse the trial Court ruling, order the rein-
~tatemPnt of the verdict in plaintiff's favor, and award 
to the plaintiff his costs as incurred 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT, and 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to Counsel respondent this ____________ day of Ociober, 1963. 
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